Patristic views on the Nature and Status of Scientific Knowledge

  1. Lemma
  2. Patristic views on the Nature and Status of Scientific Knowledge
  3. English - English
  4. Delli, Eudoxie
  5. Patristic studies - Ecology and the environment - Key thinkers - Orthodox gnosiology - Orthodox theological tradition and practice > Cult and spirituality - Orthodox critique of science
  6. 23-11-2018 - 23-11-2018
  7. Larchet, Jean-Claude [Author]. Patristic views on the Nature and Status of Scientific Knowledge
  8. Mystagogy Resource Center
  9. Clement of Alexandria - Maximus the Confessor - St Isaac the Syrian - Saint Gregory Palamas - limits of science - faith and knowledge - natural contemplation - spiritual ecology - concepts of science
  10. Click Here
    1. Based on a number of relevant texts drawn from four Fathers who belong to different periods and outlooks, Clement of Alexandria (2nd-3rd centuries), St. Maximus the Confessor (7th century), St. Isaac the Syrian (7th century) and St. Gregory Palamas (14th century), the author discusses the Orthodox approach to nature and to the status of scientific knowledge.

      In the introduction, J. C. Larchet starts by some general methodological remarks. He argues that the core components of modern science do not coincide with science as conceived by the Fathers, while the areas of knowledge which today belong to the sciences in the past were part of philosophy or they were considered as arts. Moreover, he points out the difficulty of defining a single, global approach of the Fathers in relation to what we today call science, because on the one hand there are various opinions and positions which must be taken into account, but on the other, these opinions are only insights.

      In the first section, J. C. Larchet indicates that the Fathers recognized the independence of scientific knowledge and for this reason, they are tolerant of the diverse theories worked out by it. For this purpose, he gives an example of the way the Fathers used the Hippocratic and Galenic categories on medicine. While their position is liberal, they consider that scientific knowledge is relative and therefore must be relativized as a mode of knowing in relation to another form of knowledge which is spiritual knowledge.

      The second section concerns the pragmatic notion of science which concerned the goal that sciences pursued or the goal their application attained. In fact, what made them good and valuable was the use they were put to. The pragmatic conception of the Fathers which justifies their tolerance is also related to  the person engaged in scientific knowledge: the usefulness of the sciences is then to educate the mind of the one who practices them.

      In the third part of the article, based mainly on St Gregory Palamas, the author points out the danger of losing oneself in scientific knowledge with the consequence of depriving oneself of the spiritual life. Given that the universe of unknown and inexplicable facts goes on and on forever and because scientific knowledge progresses and is constantly renewed, the risk is great of letting oneself be dragged into an endless process, both illusory and alienating.

      In the fourth section, J. C. Larchet discusses the patristic approach to the usefulness of reason and its limits. Scientific knowledge is a form of rational knowledge. The development of modern science in the area of the infinitely small has resulted in the fact that today science is less involved in sensible phenomena and measurable things, than in conceivable things. Theories are no longer explanations of observable phenomena, but are “models” constructed by reason which are only required to give a coherent understanding of reality. Modern science is, by this very fact, not just rational but rationalistic. The Fathers did not reject the value of reasoning and demonstration even in theology and spirituality. They disapproved a closed rationality as well as the use of reason which was based exclusively on sense data. Following the Fathers, reason is not autonomous but must be used in the service of the intellect and of God's revelation to which it gives access. In other words, the ultimate purpose of reason is beyond itself and beyond its content, of a natural order, to which science is limited.

      The limits of scientific knowledge and its difference from faith are discussed by the author in the fifth section. He indicates that Fathers emphasized the limits of scientific knowledge itself due to its hypothetical character and therefore to its relativity and uncertainty. Moreover, scientific knowledge always presupposed that, at its base, there are undemonstrated principles and undefined concepts, which also constitute a form of faith, as Clement of Alexandria had pointed out. Ηowever, this form of faith does not have the certainty of the Christian one, founded on the divine revelation. According to the Fathers, the first limit of science is that it remains a prisoner of the limits of nature, ignoring what is outside of and beyond it. The problem for the Fathers is that, while remaining limited to the domain of nature, science simply misses another dimension of reality, which is imperceptible to it. This is not a bad thing if science is aware of this limit and explicitly recognizes it. The danger, however, is that, in a rationalistic perspective, science sees itself as the only way of knowing the totality of what is real. The totality of what is real is open to faith. Faith gives access to the knowledge of principles while science sees only certain consequences of them, which manifest in the sensible and material world. Faith thus includes, as a matter of principle, all the knowledge of science. Science is sufficient unto itself and contains in itself the principle of its own intelligibility. Science refuses a priori to take into account any metaphysical principle for making sense of its objects. In doing this, science ignores the true principles which govern the world and produces an illusory knowledge. In other words, scientific knowledge, if developed in an exclusive manner, risks alienating man.

      In the last part, the author discusses science as knowledge of appearances inferior to spiritual knowledge that is knowledge of the essences for creatures. For this purpose, he analyzes Maximus the Confessor’s conception of logoi related to natural contemplation (physikè théôria). As Larchet notes, St. Maximus the Confessor considered that the knowledge which apprehends nature only according to sensible appearances alone, is a fruit of the ancestral sin and the fall of man and is the lowest degree of knowledge. He opposed it to a form of knowledge that, while being on the level of nature, is however able to know and to understand the beings of nature beyond their sensible appearances, in their spiritual reality which corresponds to what they really are and share with other beings. This superior form of knowledge is accessible through the purification of passions which attached him exclusively to the appearances of this world. Natural contemplation discovers God the Incarnate Logos in the logoi of beings, but it also discovers the Spirit that is present in Creation and is closely linked to liturgical, doxological and eucharistic use of nature, providing the theoretical and practical pillars for a spiritual ecology, which for the modern world is an antidote to the unreasonable exploitation of nature's resources by modern technologies which are, for the most part, application of the physical sciences.

       

    2. Based on a number of relevant texts drawn from four Fathers who belong to different periods and outlooks: Clement of Alexandria (2nd-3rd centuries), St. Maximus the Confessor (7th century), St. Isaac the Syrian (7th century) and St. Gregory Palamas (14th century), the author discusses the Orthodox approach to nature and to the status of scientific knowledge.

      In the introduction, J. C. Larchet starts by some general methodological remarks. He argues that the core components of modern science do not coincide with science as conceived by the Fathers, while the areas of knowledge which today belong to the sciences in the past were part of philosophy or they were considered as arts. Moreover, he points out the difficulty of defining a single, global approach of the Fathers in relation to what we today call science, because on the one hand there are various opinions and positions which must be taken into account, but on the other, these opinions are only insights.

      In the first section, J. C. Larchet indicates that the Fathers recognized the independence of scientific knowledge, and for this reason, they are tolerant of the diverse theories worked out by it. For this purpose, he gives an example of the way the Fathers used the Hippocratic and Galenic categories on medicine. While their position is liberal, they consider that scientific knowledge is relative and therefore must be relativized as a mode of knowing in relation to another form of knowledge which is spiritual knowledge.

      The second section concerns the pragmatic notion of science which concerned the goal that sciences pursued or the goal their application attained. In fact, what made them good and valuable was the use they were put to. The pragmatic conception of the Fathers which justifies their tolerance has also to do with the person engaged in scientific knowledge: the usefulness of the sciences is then to educate the mind of the one who practices them.

      In the third part of the article, based mainly on St Gregory Palamas, the author points out the danger of losing oneself in scientific knowledge with the consequence of depriving oneself of the spiritual life. Given that the universe of unknown and inexplicable facts goes on and on forever and because scientific knowledge progresses and is constantly renewed, the risk is great of letting oneself be dragged into an endless process, both illusory and alienating.

      In the fourth section, J. C. Larchet discusses the patristic approach to the usefulness of reason and its limits. Scientific knowledge is a form of rational knowledge. The development of modern science in the area of the infinitely small has resulted in the fact that today science is less involved in sensible phenomena and measurable things, than in conceivable things. Theories are no longer explanations of observable phenomena, but are “models” constructed by reason which are only required to give a coherent understanding of reality. Modern science is, by this very fact, not just rational but rationalist. The Fathers did not reject the value of reasoning and demonstration even in theology and spirituality. They disapproved a closed rationality as well as the use of reason which was based exclusively on sense data. Following the Fathers, reason is not autonomous but must be used in the service of the intellect and of God's revelation to which it gives access. In other words, the ultimate purpose of reason is beyond itself and beyond its content, of a natural order, to which science is limited.

      The limits of scientific knowledge and its difference from faith are discussed by the author in the fifth section. He indicates that Fathers emphasized the limits of scientific knowledge itself due to its hypothetical character and therefore to its relativity and uncertainty. Moreover, scientific knowledge always presupposed that, at its base, there are undemonstrated principles and undefined concepts, which also constitute a form of faith, as Clement of Alexandria had pointed out. Ηowever, this form of faith does not have the certainty of the Christian one, founded on the divine revelation. According to the Fathers, the first limit of science is that it remains a prisoner of the limits of nature, ignoring what is outside of and beyond it. The problem for the Fathers is that, while remaining limited to the domain of nature, science simply misses another dimension of reality, which is imperceptible to it. This is not a bad thing if science is aware of this limit and explicitly recognizes it. The danger, however, is that, in a rationalist perspective, science sees itself as the only way of knowing the totality of what is real. The totality of what is real is open to faith. Faith gives access to the knowledge of principles while science sees only certain consequences of them, which manifest in the sensible and material world. Faith thus includes, as a matter of principle, all the knowledge of science. Science is sufficient unto itself and contains in itself the principle of its own intelligibility. Science refuses a priori to take into account any metaphysical principle for making sense of its objects. In doing this, science ignores the true principles which govern the world and produces an illusory knowledge. In other words, scientific knowledge, if developed in an exclusive manner, risks alienating man.

      In the last part, the author discusses science as knowledge of appearances inferior to spiritual knowledge that is knowledge of the essences for creatures. For this purpose, he analyzes Maximus the Confessor’s conception of logoi related to natural contemplation (physikè théôria). As Larchet notes, St. Maximus the Confessor considered that the knowledge which apprehends nature only according to sensible appearances alone is a fruit of the ancestral sin and the fall of man and is the lowest degree of knowledge. He opposed it to a form of knowledge that, while being on the level of nature, is however able to know and to understand the beings of nature beyond their sensible appearances, in their spiritual reality which corresponds to what they really are and share with other beings. This superior form of knowledge is accessible through the purification of passions which attached him exclusively to the appearances of this world. Natural contemplation discovers God the Incarnate Logos in the logoi of beings, but it also discovers the Spirit that is present in Creation and is closely linked to liturgical, doxological and eucharistic use of nature, providing the theoretical and practical pillars for a spiritual ecology, which for the modern world is an antidote to the unreasonable exploitation of nature's resources by modern technologies which are, for the most part, application of the physical sciences.