Nesteruk, Alexei. Light from the East: Theology, Science, and the Eastern Orthodox Tradition

  1. Work (Individual)
    1. Nesteruk, Alexei
  3. 2003
  4. English
    1. This book by Alexei Nesteruk was one of the first to try and tackle the relationship between science and Orthodoxy in recent years and the only one, in its time, to do so from the perspective of a practicing scientist. The main goal of the book is to show how and why can Orthodoxy and science come in dialogue. The author starts by juxtaposing the multitude of Western religious view to the monolithic Orthodoxy. He states that Orthodoxy never tried to incorporate science into its theology, nor did it develop a natural theology, because it is based in a Patristic synthesis, which links truth to liturgical experience. Indeed, the author considers truth to be the common foundation between Orthodoxy and science, because it is the goal of both and has a common source for both: God, who is revealed through communion. Thus, for the author, science should be viewed as cosmic eucharistic work. Science is the offering back to God of creation. The book has seven chapters, with the short introduction being the first. In the introduction, the author considers the dimensions of the book’s problematic. These include the historical dimension (Why was the Greek patristic synthesis forgotten in the West?), the geographical (the ‘belated underdevelopment’ of the Orthodox countries and the archival one (existing scholarship on the subject of Orthodoxy and the sciences). Finally, the author proposes that a discussion on science and Orthodoxy should be seen a religious experience, that is, an ecclesial and liturgical activity which will be based on something akin to a new Patristic synthesis. Apophaticism, meant as the freedom granted to Orthodox Christians to explore experientially a life in God, is also given a prominent position. The final component is the apprehension of Christ as the incarnation of Logos, of intelligibility in a contingent creation. The second chapter describes the relationship between Patristic theology and the natural science in a historical setting, focusing on Church fathers like St. Athanasius and St. Maximus the Confessor, and juxtaposing their work with that of St. Augustine. The end goal of the chapter is to discuss the differences between Latin and Greek treatments of nature. The chapter begins from classical Greek and Alexandrian science, highlighting its roots in philosophy and continues with the Apologists which grappled with Gnosticism and its philosophical roots, such as St. Irenaeus of Lyons and Justin the Martyr. It then moves on to Clement of Alexandria, seen as the founder of a Christian theology based on philosophy. Nesteruk discusses faith as a condition of knowledge and as philosophy as a companion of science in the context of Clement’s thought. He then tackles the writings of the Greek Fathers, and their interpretation of nature as understandable in Christian terms. He also emphasized the Greek Fathers’ take of natural laws as established by God, but operating autonomously. Evil that exists in nature will then become absent when animals and matter regain their union with God. The next part of the chapter deals with St. Athanasius and his argument for the appearance of God’s Logos in the uniformity of nature. Special mention is given to Athanasius’ teaching that the incarnation of Christ, appearing as a body localized but also as the Divine co-inherent in every point in space, imbues uniformity and rationality in the cosmos. St. Maximus the Confessor is discussed next, as the Father who demonstrated how the presence of Logos from within the created realm. The crucial step in doing so is to recognize that, it is through the Logos that man can go beyond the perception of nature as fragmented towards seeing the cosmos communally. It is the human hyspostasis that makes spiritual, unifying, symbolic perception possible. This part of the chapter ends with the note that, for the Greek Fathers, contemplating nature was a step towards the final goal of knowing God. By detaching themselves from nature, they could contemplate it without subverting their spiritual vision of reality. The second part of the second chapter deals with the Latin Church and its relationship to the natural sciences. After making the point that this relationship was founded almost exclusively on the teachings of Latin Fathers, the author proceeds to discuss how St./ Augustine tried to reconcile the apparent tension between an unfolding world and the Genesis discussion of a world created in its entirety. He thus proceeds to discuss St. Augustine teaching of seminal reasons within nature, and to show how St. Augustine proposed seminal reasons as a theological explanation, not one subject to empirical confirmation. Such a view makes science the handmaiden of theology, since the best it can serve a Christian is to direct him in finding out traces of God’s activity. Nature is not to be admired, only the Creator is. The chapter ends by drawing two conclusions: Firstly, that the handmaiden formula developed by St. Augustine influenced Latin Christianity very differently that what we can see in the Greek tradition. Secondly, that there are dogmatic differences in the two viewpoints developed, which in Latin Christianity lead to a demystification of nature not apparent in Orthodoxy. The third chapter discusses the role and scope of theology, as a science and as a practice. It starts by noting that theology is not a scriptural term. Thus, there is no established meaning of theology within the Church Fathers. In fact, the book, argues, Fathers like Maximus, Clement and St. Gregory Palamas saw theology as based on a personal and ecclesial experience of God. It is attained through communion, participation and is a gift bestowed to only a few. The rest can only aspire to a lower theological status, by trusting the saints. Truth in theology also depends on the eucharist, and as such, in community. The book then goes on to argue about the inevitability of mysticism in Orthodox Theology, since it is based on personal involvement. It is also necessary to speak about a different kind of objectivity, which requires faith in the object studied instead of detachment. With these in mind, the book makes the point that there are different views of science within the western tradition, and that it is problematic to assume a standpoint outside the debate for a comparison between science and theology to take place.Then, the arguments proceeds to say that the epistemological foundations of theologia come from the experience of God himself and as such, they transcend science. Finally, the chapter discusses the role of the human faculty in the discussion, where it is necessary to move from rationality to contemplation, in analogy to asciension from the created realm to its foundations. Then the book discusses the difference between dianoia and nous, and hos this leads into the view that science will be of a lower standing compared to the synthesis of science and theology in Orthodoxy. The foundation itself, Nesteruk proposes, is to be found in Lossky’s Mystical theology. From it, theology as a larger epistemological field that science appears, since science is solely based on reason, which theology can contain, but not vice versa. Chapter Four focuses on philosophy as the tool through which the mediation between science and religion will be achieved. To create such a philosophical language, the author draws from Maximus and from apophatism in general, as a way to transcend reason and get to a scriptural, experiential and mystical narrative. To make apophatism compatible with philosophical abstraction, it needs to be understood as two modes, firstly as a direct mystical experience and secondly as based on worldly knowledge. Cataphatic and apophatic knowledge are thus combined. In this context, the chapter moves on to discuss scientific monism, as the ideal that the world is knowable and ontologically self-sustained. Nesteruk describes various iterations of this argument from Hawking to Kant, and notes Polkinghorne’s argument as similar to that of Maximus. He then moves on to discussing the dialectic between apophatism and cataphatism, drawning on Dionysius Areopagite and Evagrius Ponticus, and then back to Maximus the Confessor. By creating antinomies through limited applications, the author arrives at the conclusion that we require transrational knowledge, which is both rational and antinomial. He then uses this synthesis to discuss Kant’s objections, via antinomies, to discussions about the existence of God. The author then moves to draw from various Patristic sources arguments that show how Kantian antinomies are in fact based on specific rationalistic horizons which do not necessary frame the discussion. Then, in the next section, an attempt is made to show Kantian antinomes, if seen through the lenses of the Christian tradition. To do so, he again draws from Gregory Palamas, Maximus, Dionysius and Gregory of Nyssa. The end argument is that, in the end, that humanity participates in establishing nature together with God, through Christ, by knowing matter and allowing matter to know itself. Reason was thus given to in a dialogical relationship with the reason of God. In the next part of the chapter, the question of whether articulation of the personhood of God can be achieved from within creation, if we take into account the previous discussion of the Logoi. The key for that is to be found in the difference between ‘natural’ and ‘hypostatic’ existence. ‘Hypostasis’ means the externally concrete character of a substance as compares with its ousia. Through this distinction, the unity of creation is articulated. the creation and existence of the universe is enhypostatic, in that it exists in the hypostasis of the Logos but that the very knowledge of it can be achieved if nature is contemplated in the human hypostasis. Thus, human consciousness cannot be alienated from physical research or from theological generalizations, since it is part of the driving force of the universe. Humans are beings-in-the-world-with-God. The next two chapters attempt tot tackle specific themes of modern scientific knowledge, cosmological creation and then irreversibility of time. Creation ex nihilo is associated with the whole of Christian tradition, from Athanasius and the Cappadocian Fathers onwards. The important element brought to the fore is the hidden rationality of a contingent creation. This hinges on the incarnation of the Logos of God through Christ. Thus, scientific cosmology can help ponder the immanent logoi and as such, the creative rationality of the uncreated Logos. In that regard, creation ex nihilo cannot be challenged by modern cosmology. The chapter then discusses classical and quantum cosmology and frames it in terms of Kantian antinomy. However, it is strange that the author does not clarify that, according to general relativity, time and space were created with the Big Bang, and rather goes on discussing a prior existence of time and space as part of an antinomy. Nor does he reference any modern philosophical takes on space and time such as those of Friedman, since his argument hinges on the exact same matters. He only tackles a specific formulation by Penrose and Hawking, on the context of singularity. He then tackles Hawking’s proposal for an imaginary time, which, however, has now been completely discarded by modern cosmologists. The end result of this discussion is that in no way challenges a creation ex nihilo, especially if we reintroduce the distinction of neoplatonists between transcendent and empirical time. Moreover, the antinomies they create show that more than empirical and intelligible components of a cosmological theory of creation are needed, components that will also include a theory of intelligence or noesis. In the end, the author proposes that quantum cosmology and models of creation out of nothing can be used in a theologically mediated way as indications of divine rationality which stands behind contingent creation. In dealing with the problem of the irreversibility of time, the author tackles two specific proposals, one from Penrose and one from Prigogine. After describing their basic structure, the author attempts to show how that they end up suggesting an underlying ultimate reality beyond the observable. The chapter then moves on to reinterpret these findings as kantian antinomies and with parallels from Orthodox theology and thought. In the end, Nesteruk considers these cosmological problems of prime theological importance, because they outline the presence of implicit theological ingredients, such as diaphora, in modern cosmological thought. The author also sees them as showing the similarity between the world at large and the anthropological constitution of humankind. However, once again, in this chapter, we see possible parallels between reinterpretations of theories and Orthodox theology been taken as arguments, and a disregard of modern philosophical considerations of them. As a theological point, the necessity of incorporating human consciousness to cosmology is also very reminiscent of Thomas Torrance’s views. The seventh and last chapter of the book tackles humanity as hypostasis of the Universe. the main argument of the chapter is that the development of intelligent human life is not something that can be fully explained by naturalistic and materialistic explanations and that it must instead be viewed as an hypostatic event, which points towards an uncreated realm of the Divine. Cosmology is to be seen as corroborating such a view, and in the end, human scientific discourse ends up entangling the universe with humanity-as hypostasis, and this with the Logos of God. The chapter begins by briefly discussing how the humanity-event, as the author calls it, is rather remarkable from a cosmological point of view, because the universe at large, seen both spatially and temporarily, is more or less inhospitable to human life. Moreover, the basic physical constants are ‘fine tuned’ to allow humanity to appear, and if they were only slightly different, life would be impossible. This is, more or less, a rehash of the anthropic argument. Not only that, but the future of the universe is also grim from an anthropological point of view. The next part of the chapter discusses the two formulations of the Anthropic Principle, referencing Barrow and Tipler’s Anthropic Cosmological Principle book, known as the Strong Anthropic Principle (SAP) and the Weak Anthropic Principle (WAP). The author shows that neither are sufficient for claiming that life was an essential characteristic of the universe, and also criticizes them for again looking for explanations within a naturalistic context. It then moves on to discussions of Bernard’s experiment and its discussions based on information theory and chaotic systems, as those by Polkinghorne. Nesterul attempts an Orthodox reading of such attempts by moving away from purely scientific definitions of information and towards discussions of a contingent, based on the logoi, order whose shift brings it about. The final conclusion of the chapter is that the phenomenon of man in the universe can only be elucidated by appeal to a theology of creation. The last four parts of the chapter are devoted to sketching such a theology. The first part of the argument is based on an elucidation of the hypostatic dimension of the humankind event. Humankind’s ability to see the universe through science, being itself composed be persons, whose personhood cannot be fully communicated, and thus it is outside reductionist explanations, is seen the crucial fact. Cosmology is then a basic component of humans being both dependent on the structure of the universe and the main formulators of knowledge. Based on the thought of St. Maximus, the author sees the universe as enhypostaisized, with humanity as mediators between the microcosm and the megacosm. Human beings are made inherent in the hypostasis of the Logos, and all other objects are made inherent in the Logos through humanity, without having hypostasis. The chapter then moves to discussing the epistemological consequences of humankind’s ability to know the universe and attempts to reflect on how this impacts om discussions of cosmological knowledge been anthropic by definition. By drawing on Kantian philosophy and Christian Platonism, it moves on tο the Many-Worlds hypothesis as a corollary to the SAP, and attempts its theological interpretation. It reformulates its conclusions as a Kantian antinomy and once more analyzes according to the technique developed in chapters 6 and 6, as an indication between a split of the sensible world and the intelligible world. The presence of this diaphora is once again seen as a strong argument for the hypostatic existence of the human and of the role of the logoi within the universe. The chapter continues with an exploration of the participatory Anthropic principle, where humanity is seen as a vital component of the universe existence. It discusses Wheeler’s arguments on that score, and emphasizes the importance of the network of observers that Wheeler puts forward, but decries its naturalistic elements. The author discusses how Wheeler’s arguments do not explain the intelligibility of the universe, whereas a Patristic explanation does so. The chapter then moves on to offering an explanation of why the humankind-event has happened, and why is the universe intelligible. By drawing on Gregory of Nyssa and on St. Maximus, but also by discussing Ellis attempt for a Christian anthropic principle, it discusses how the universe became ecclesial with the Christ-event. The universe became capable for sustaining human life because the Christ-event was imminent in its structure. From that standpoint, a number of characteristics of the universe, such s its space-time structure and its future can be discussed theologically. Also, the universe seen as an hypostasis of the Logos enables the human hypostasis to be seen as a non-trivial microcosm. That means that humanity itself can influence the future of the universe by certain moral and ethical stances, since the finality of the humanity-event predicates the future of the whole hypostasis. In short, different futures -passive extinction in a cosmological future versus getting hit by an asteroid- are predicated upon humanity’s relation to its naturalistic elements. Then, after discussing the role of cosmology -social, intellectual and cultural- in humanity’s viewpoints, the chapter, and the book in whole, ends by discussing eschatology, under the light of the arguments proposed by the book.